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Abstract
All too often the agenda for discussion of institutional accounts
of art has been set by George Dickie's (putative) institutional
definition of art. To offer a new beginning, the paper addresses
the question of explanation with an institutional framework
modeled as Terry Diffey’s Republic of Art. In exploring the
argumentative resources here, it meets the objection that
institutionalism cannot explore the case of so-called ‘first art’:
objects created before the concept art came into being. In
particular, the paper uses an example to consider how
disputes within the Republic might be resolved through rational
means, while still maintaining the institutional character of
such discussions. For we need not assume that institutionalism
has no mechanisms for rational self-correction nor that one,
timeless resolution is always possible. Instead, we can find
rational activity in the disputes among art critics, as well as
contrasting their (broadly contemporary) perspective on the
case with the detachment of the (philosophical) aesthetician.
Key Words
authoritative body, institutional decisions, Institutionalism,
institutional reasons, other-acclamation, Republic of Art, self-
election, Terry Diffey
1. Introduction
Consider what might be thought the worst outcomes for any
account of art — hence the worst for any plausible institutional
account. Any satisfactory account of art must preclude:
• the case where ‘wishing makes it so,’ where such-and-such
is an work of art, or of artistic value, just because I say it is —
where, for example, my wanting to be an artist is all there is
to it. What makes this case such a disaster is that — if even
possible — it precludes ascribing any stability or objectivity to
artistic judgment. And this case seems to thrive if an
institutional account stresses self-election to the institutional
structure: that is, to the Republic of Art.[1]
• the case of the ‘unintended artist’ where (say) an ‘object’
made in a society with no concept of art is nonetheless taken
as art. This case is a disaster because it breaks the tie
between the ‘artworks’ themselves and wanting or trying to
make art (and hence being responsible if one succeeds). And
this case seems to thrive where other-acclamation by the
Republic of Art is crucial for art-status.
So these are just the features institutional theories of art are
supposed (by their critics) to permit or encourage. But, as an
advocate of a (broadly) institutional account of art,[2] it has
long seemed to me that one strength of my position lay in its
permitting an appropriate response to these issues. And being
rendered more plausible in the bargain!
• Moreover, an attractive thought for philosophical aesthetics is
that any account of art should give weight to the context or
background of specific artmaking and art-understanding. Such
accounts assume a body of human beings interested in art and
also in practices which (while not themselves artmaking) bear
on it — for instance, practices of learning artmaking, and
acquiring and developing skills one might then use in art-
making, as well as concerns with displaying, restoring and
discussing artworks.[3] Further, at least for performing arts,
there will also be training in performance, as we might say, in
art-instantiating! [4] Moreover, there are traditions of
performance and venues (of various sorts) for its presentation,
and institutionalism will stress such features.
Unfortunately, the prospects for an institutional account of art
have become entangled with the fortunes of George Dickie’s
(putative) institutional definition of art. For the literature on
institutional accounts of art typically accepts the features of
Dickie’s version as identifying all (or anyway most) of the
requirements for institutionalism about art.
A full treatment of that argument would require us to broach
complex issues concerning what precisely Dickie said and
meant (and, perhaps, when). We could begin with the version
that Dickie put forward in his book Art and the Aesthetic
(1974)[5] — although he has other, more recent versions
(especially that from his book The Art Circle (1984))[6] and he
took much discussion of the 1974 version to be
misconceived.[7] Here, instead, I briefly motivate the project
of an institutional account of art before commenting on some
typical lines of criticism (including some discussion of the
‘unintended art’ case). Then, via commentary on a published
criticism of institutionalism, I confront a very serious objection
concerning the rationality of the decision-making in the
institution. I will deal with it primarily via a worked example
(the case of the Friends of Jones’ Painting) which shows such
an account in action.
2. The Contours of Institutional Theories of Art
First, as a general characterization, vague enough to
accommodate the variety of theories or accounts plausibly
called “institutional,” consider a picture from Anthony Quinton
“Institutional concepts … are those that apply to the
fruits of human contrivance. First and foremost artefacts
(tools, machines, houses, furnishings); then institutions
proper (marriage, property, the state); the social roles
associated with them (king, priest, creditor); customs
and practices (manners, games, meals).” [8]
This is suggestive of what it means to talk of art as
institutional: roughly, that something is art if the right people
say it is; that what is and is not a work of art is determined by
humans and, arguably, for humans, or that art-status is a
product of some kind of human consensus. Moreover, my
account is stronger than Quinton’s in recognizing that, with
respect to genuine institutional concepts (in this sense),[9] not
all human beings have a say. In (other) rule-governed
concepts — for instance, language — (give or take a few
qualifications) correctness of usage is the province of all native
speakers and typified by Mr. or Ms. Everyone, the person on
the Clapham omnibus (as we say in the UK). By contrast, the
normativity of an established institutional concept like art
requires that some, but not others, can pronounce on its
normativity.[10] It is the activity of this ‘institution’ that marks
out the concept as institutional. So institutional concepts in my
sense (as, arguably, in Kuhn’s)[11] require an authoritative
body[12] — although perhaps of an unstructured kind.
Here we see a further reason for insisting that, in the relevant
sense, the concept art is institutional. It would mean that
points such as these (concerning the practical workings of the
concept) are parts of the philosophy of art, not (merely) the
sociology of art. For the idea of an institutional concept in this
sense gives due weight to such factors. If there are
institutional concepts in this strong sense — in particular, if art
is one of them — matters of these sorts will be relevant to the
explanation (the ‘analysis’) of such concepts.
3. Two Issues for Institutionalism
Let us turn from exposition to the meeting of criticisms. In his
book on the philosophy of music,[13] Bob Sharpe identifies
what he takes to be the “... two difficulties ... that are most
often aired” in respect of institutionalism — although he
introduces them as problems for proceduralism, which he says
“... differs little from what was previously called
‘institutionalism’.”[14]
The first difficulty concerns circularity. Sharpe says that “... it
is hard to see how we can get the notion of the art-world off
the ground without reference to art.” But once the thought
that our project is to formally define ‘art’ (say, by the offering
of conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient) is
put aside, then the issue of circularity connects directly and
positively to ideas behind institutionalism as a position in
philosophical aesthetics. For the default position for
philosophical aesthetics is to accept as art (roughly) the
“catalogue” of artworks from the “canon” of art . That is,
roughly, we accept the extension of the concept ‘art’ from the
doings and sayings of the artworld. As aestheticians, we do
not, in general, decide what is and what is not art, except
perhaps that our endeavors have an implicit reference to the
world outside, and to the (changing) catalogue of artworks it
endorses. This ‘failure’ to extract ourselves from artworld
practice would be (or, anyway, might be) a problem for an
attempted definition of art, but not here. So circularity need
not concern us.
Sharpe characterizes his second difficulty as ‘first art.’ He
considers “... those artefacts that were created before
anybody possessed anything like our concept of art.” [Note in
passing that I take it the expression “our concept of art” just
means art or fine art — the “our concept” is not here doing
work; it is not as though the makers of the Altamira cave
paintings had some other concept of art.] Of these ‘first art’
cases, Sharpe comments: “We count these as art ....”
It is worth noting, though, that the issue concerning so-called
‘first art’ closely resembles that in respect of the “unintended
art” noted initially. In both, we have objects which, on the face
of it, are not made as artworks or not made under the concept
'art' and yet find their ways into our museums and art
galleries. And the received wisdom here seems to be that such
cases prove especially problematic for institutional accounts.
What should we say about these issues? On the issue of “first
art,” I am not inclined simply to grant that the objects at issue
are obviously artworks. For it is not obvious that every thing
we display in an art-gallery is art. We might well display, for
instance, objects that had stimulated artworks, and this seems
even more likely when we turn from galleries to museums.
Further, these “first-art” objects do not suggest ways for a
current artist to make art (except perhaps as kitsch). The
discussion really falls into three related parts.
To begin, we can put aside one conception of “first art.” For it
might seem that there must be a 'first art', a set of objects
initially considered in the way artworks are. But how on an
institutionalist view could that be? For what institution (what
artworld or Republic of Art) licenses their art-status? But that
question arises from a misconception, like those involved in
looking for language and pre-language, or asking how one can
acquire the concepts concerning the external world needed for
the experience that those concepts then mediate, if concept-
acquisition has an experiential base. This is an example of
what Wittgenstein rightly called trying “to go further back” (OC
§471) than is possible. So the problem of 'first art' is not the
problem of “art prior to the artworld.”
Then granting that point reinforces the connection of candidate
'first art' works, and hence of the ‘first art’ problem, to objects
arising (so anthropologists tell us) from societies lacking the
concept art. Where it is clear or granted that the society lacks
the concept ‘art,’ the examples seem to be of two types. For
one type, the most common, we should accept that the
objects are not art, despite their decorative appeal or their
similarity to objects we otherwise regard as artworks (such as
some frescos and murals). For such works, having no place in
the narrative of art history, cannot imply strategies for
contemporary art-making. This tough line is surely consistent
with the thought (not dependent on institutionalism) that, in
order to make art, one must intend to make art, although we
might want to reconsider some peripheral cases, such as those
sketches not intended as art which are later seen as part of
the artist’s oeuvre. The guiding thought here is a perfectly
general one: that one is responsible for one’s actions. And,
notice, we are importing considerations of the extent of the
object itself. We take just the painting to be an artwork.
Hence we think of that painting as constituting a single,
complete “thing” not including the wall on which it hangs, as
we recognize a pair of spectacles as one thing divorced from
the case containing them or the surroundings. And we do
something similar for the cave paintings because genuine
artworks are typically circumscribed in roughly this way. So we
treat the cave paintings as one “object,” but the other walls of
cave as another, and so on. Yet there is no need to think that
this was how their makers viewed these objects. Perhaps they
thought that the whole cave was to be considered for their
(ritual) purposes; or the whole cave including some of the
surrounding area. So we do not know what, for their makers,
constituted a unity here, we do not know what the object is! It
makes sense to deny art-status to such cases.
The other type of example from societies lacking the concept
‘art’ concerns objects treated as art by extension or by
convention. Here, we should note that these are highly
peculiar cases of art, for instance in lacking authors and not
just as when the author is unknown. Rather, since these
objects were not made as art, there cannot be any artist as
author of them. But we decide to treat them as art by drawing
explicitly on what we know of the past of art, that is, on the
institution.
It is clear, then, that there are no difficulties for
institutionalism flowing from either of these types of cases —
the objects are either not art really, despite their similarities
to artworks or the words we might sometimes use of them, or
are art only by extension from the current artworld. So, as
long as it is given that the society in question lacked the
concept ‘art,’ there is really no problem.
Then, finally, suppose we are unsure of the status of some
other candidate 'first art' objects, since we do not know their
function or enough about the societies from which they
originate to assume that these societies do or do not have the
concept ‘art.’ Note that this is how Sharpe initially treats 'first
art.' He says, “there is certainly no reason to suppose that ...
[their creators] thought of them as ‘works of art’.” But also no
reason for confidence they did not. Where this is the situation,
we can look to anthropologists and historians for help, of
course. Still, when that help is exhausted,[15] we have two
cases to consider. If the most plausible reading suggests that
the relevant society lacked the concept ‘art,’ the objects can
be treated in either of the ways outlined previously. For they
too will now originate from societies uncontentiously lacking
the concept ‘art.’ And we have seen that these pose no threat
to institutionalism. When, to the contrary, that reading
suggests there was, after all, a conception of art in the society
under consideration, it implicitly acknowledges an artworld
Hence it too poses no threat to institutionalism.
Moreover, we have here exactly the resources needed to deal
both with those ‘unintended artists’ whose work, produced in a
social setting where art flourishes, we do regard as artists,
despite their avowed denials; and with those whose denials, if
they could be made, we would readily accept. For, in the first
case, we have plausible artists, that is, art-makers who do not
see their own work as art, although they could have! In effect,
we are re-assigning the category-ascription here to another
our (now) artists might have selected. (One explanation might
be that some activities were not, at the time, valued as
artworks were valued, but we see that they can be.)[16] Yet
there is no need to do that for the other category. We may
want to preserve various objects — and especially decorative
objects — in our museums and perhaps galleries; but that
does not require our other-acclaiming them as art.
4. The Place of Reasons in an Institutional Account of
Art
I turn now to another objection, that will occupy the rest of
this paper. This objection can be put by asking, “Can an
institutional account of art accommodate the place of reason;
and, in particular, the normative force of the reasoning?” For it
might seem that to appeal to what does go on in the Republic
of Art is precisely to lose the ability to debate what should
happen, so that, say, institutional decisions can never be
contested nor argued against. For instance, Tiffany Sutton[17]
claims that an institutional account of art “... can only explain
why Warhol’s Brillo Box was taken up into the canon of art
history, not whether it should have been.”
Even putting aside Sutton’s reference to a “canon of art
history” (as picking up those temporary paradigms a particular
narrative tradition employs), her remark precisely misses the
point here, in urging that institutionalism does not have,
among its resources, a place for rational engagement. As my
defense of the artistic/aesthetic contrast illustrates,[18] taking
some object as an artwork brings with it a critical vocabulary
for works in that category. For the fact that the object before
us is or is not an artwork is crucial for its appreciation. As
Arthur Danto[19] puts it: “The aesthetic [better, artistic]
difference presupposed the ontological difference.” We take
from Danto here the transformative effect of art-status: that
the artwork acquires artistic properties — and this
distinguishes it from its ‘non-art’ cousins. In a similar way, a
graceful action might simply be my walking (to work), or part
of my gymnastic floor work, or part of my dance: but these
are not equivalent actions — that it is dance (when it is)
transforms, or transfigures, that action.
Moreover, when (say) the action of a road sweeper is
transfigured to become part of my dance work, there is a clear
sense in which it is changed — a set of properties is acquired
— and a sense in which it is not. The patterns of muscular
movement, say, might be the same. This tells us something
about the nature of the new properties: roughly, to say that a
movement pattern becomes transfigured into a part of a dance
is to say that we can (and should) now see the movement
pattern that way — and this is what its being different consists
in! Further, the ‘transfiguration’ into artwork is important just
in bringing with it a critical vocabulary of the kind appropriate
to art. For the work now has a place in a ‘narrative’ of art-
history, or in a tradition: a category of art now applies. And a
different critical discourse follows.
Consider how Carl André’s collection of fire bricks, Equivalent
VIII, might be discussed: in particular, the suggestion that
(roughly) André does for texture (as embodied, in this case, in
the fire bricks) what Turner did for colour.[20] And,
sometimes, the critical possibilities can be revealed through an
unexpected comparison. Thus, consider the suggestion that —
in order to see the Tracy Emin Unmade Bed as an artwork —
one see it as though a painting of a bed. This brings out the
sense in which (one might think) it is really a three-
dimensional depiction of a bed. This in turn is one way to see
it as other than a ‘real thing’, consonant with ideas from
Arthur Danto.[21] Moreover, we are familiar (say, from Van
Gogh’s boots) with the depiction of everyday objects from the
artist’s life — familiar, that is, with seeing how these might be
artistically resonant, such that our discussion might soon be
conducted in terms of, say, the revelation (or embodiment) of
aspects of the artist’s personality.[22] And this is just to
integrate these comments with others concerning artworks.
As these cases should illuminate, our discussion does not
depend on the cases being in some way odd or unusual or
problematic[23] — although some of them can seem
problematic (the better to put pressure on the philosophical
claims). Further, at the center of the discussion of each are
features or factors rightly considered of importance in respect
of other artworks — in particular, of wholly traditional ones,
from the center of the artistic canon. So, faced with opponents
who insist on general skepticism about the rationality of artistic
judgment, I cannot here demonstrate that these procedures
are rational. But I have sketched how they embody roughly
some of the same rational structures as feature in other
discussions in aesthetic appreciation (and philosophical
aesthetics more generally).
Hence institutionalism does have among its resources a place
for rational engagement, hence (pace Sutton) it can explain
why Warhol’s Brillo Box had a place in the artworld. For if we
ask whether the object should have been recognized as art
after it has been, we have, in principle, (artistic) reasons
whyBrillo Box should indeed have been taken as an artwork:
we have the critical vocabulary its acknowledgement
generates. We could use that vocabulary to explain why the
Republic did ‘the right thing.’ In this case, then, Sutton is
wrong and the required perspective here is, roughly, that of
Feyerabend’s practitioners rather than that of
philosophers.[24] Further, the practitioners rightly make the
judgment from the contemporary viewpoint.
If, on the other hand, we ask before the object has been
“taken up” (and on the assumption that its “taking up” is
problematic), the question itself has no clear sense, at least,
for us and for two related reasons. Let us call such problematic
examples “disputable cases” for short. Then, first, the concepts
by which we, after the “taking up” understand ‘art’ are
different from those before the “disputable case” is
acknowledged, if only subtly so. Indeed, in this case, the
properties of Brillo Box are differentially inflected by its being
or not being an artwork. For we can truly say different things
of it in each case. Indeed, this is just a moral from Danto’s
gallery of indiscernibles: artworks and ‘real things’ may have
different properties, even when we might mistake one for the
other.[25] So the question of whether it should be an artwork
cannot, in the imagined, problematic case, simply be resolved
say, by reference to the properties of the object since the
precise nature of these properties is simultaneously up for
grabs. Second, the ‘dispute,’ however brief, in respect of our
“disputable case” should be seen as a clash of views of what
art is, of what counts as art. It is rather like the disputes
among scientists during a periods of revolutionary science,[26]
when no single paradigm for scientificity is in place. Once a
resolution is reached, then the question is clear — but so is
the answer! Before, we can only repeat that these are
disputable cases and join in the dispute, which will be centrally
a dispute in art-criticism. If a philosopher of art viewed this
process from some imaginary "outside," she might conclude
that the two positions were actually incommensurable, passing
one another by.[27] But this is one limit on abstract modeling,
for this case is resolved in practice and we would be foolish to
dismiss the resolution as somehow irrational when this is all
the rationality there is here! A parallel with legal cases might
be informative too. They arrive at resolutions but, since full
evidence is lacking, the conclusion is not compelled in the
manner imagined by some scientists and some logicians.[28]
Can institutional judgments — those of the Republic of Art —
be wrong? To reply, we should first clarify where such a
question fits into our more general picture. We saw that one
concern was that our account of art avoid the ‘unintended
artist.’ Following Terry Diffey, our response here required that
being an artist involves self-election to the Republic of Art; or,
if this is different, a self-election process of one’s work as an
artwork. Our other concern must avoid “wishing makes it so,”
and (as we have seen) our strategy here stressed the activity
of the Republic of Art that putative artworks must be other-
acclaimed by the Republic.
5. Rationality and Institutional Debate
In this context, can the Republic of Art be wrong? Now such a
question will not usually arise for self-election: there,
something is presented to the Republic. But what of the other
kind of case, and especially in its strongest form, one denying
art-status? Well, a particular judgment of the Republic of Art,
say, one which fails to other-acclaim work Y, can indeed be
taken by art critics at some later time to be wrong, and
correctly. This is as we expect from the practitioners’
perspective on works. Similarly, philosophers of art will
recognize that, at the earlier time, the judgment on work Y
was right: it was the judgment of the Republic of Art on that
work. If events or changes in artistic concepts or artistic
sensibility reverse the conclusion later, that is formally
irrelevant now. For, now, we have only the reasons, concepts,
insights, traditions, and so on of now.
It is worth expanding this case a little to sketch a simplified
example in more detail. For the Republic of Art is not unitary
and, at a particular time, there might be those waiting for
posterity’s “judgment” on their artworks, and those actively
engaged in the Public Relations exercise to change taste. So
there are lots of voices here, not necessarily in agreement.
Notice, though, that such cases will be the exception rather
than the rule: that most judgments of the Republic of Art are
never (seriously) challenged in this way in practice.
Imagine, therefore, a revolutionary style of easel painting,
which is self-elected by a particular painter, Jones, and her
colleagues, but rejected by the Republic of Painting. Jones’
work is turned down by all the major galleries. It is even
rejected from the Radicals Exhibition of that year and, when
seen in a small gallery, roundly panned by art critics. Jones
herself is aggrieved at this treatment. What galls her especially
is that, being a keen historian of art, Jones knows that similar
fates have befallen Monet, Van Gogh, and so on. Further,
Jones knows of cases where judgments of the Republic of
Painting, especially its positive judgments on some of her
peers, have been bizarre and eventually exposed as such. She
is convinced that the Republic of Painting is wrong about her
work, but she decides to wait for the judgment of posterity.
Now Jones is here a member of the Republic of Painting under
one heading — as an art historian — but not (presently) as a
artist. So her case already recognizes diversity within the
Republic of Painting. Then Jones thinks that the “final”
judgment is mistaken, that the specific judgments are wrong.
And that really means what reflection on Monet, van Gogh,
and so on has taught her: that even great art, which theirs
undoubtedly is (and she takes hers to be), can remain
unacclaimed. So she waits for posterity to right the wrong (as
she sees it), as it did in these other cases!
Her position here grants the force of the judgments of the
Republic of Painting in other cases, in particular, in respect of
Monet and van Gogh. So she is not here disputing the
mechanism but thinking that it operated in a faulty way in her
case. Perhaps, thinking of legal parallels, she takes this to be a
travesty of justice.
However, the Friends of Jones (her official support group) take
a more aggressive line here. They are the ones who, in the
model, argued for the art-status of Jones’ easel paintings, but
who lost the argument. And, like many cases in law,[29] the
substance of the conclusion then was a fact — that so-and-so
did the murder, or that Jones’ painting is not an artwork.[30]
But the Friends of Jones think there has been a miscarriage of
justice in this case. They think that the Republic of Painting is
presently dominated by a bunch of fogies with no real artistic
sensibility. So they set out to change the taste of the Republic
of Painting or, what may come to the same thing, to change
its contemporary membership. They use their influence to get
Jones’ work seen (speaking privately to friendly gallery-owners
just before Jones arrives with her work, and so on). They write
articles for learned journals praising Jones’ virtuosity,
creativity, mastery of the brush-stroke. And, while many of
the articles are turned down (most editors are consenting
members of the Republic of Painting), enough are published to
cause a bit of a stir. The Friends of Jones even manage to get
a painting by Jones a “product placement” in the background
in a major motion picture; and, as a result, a small arts
television programme is made about Jones’ painting.
If the Friends of Jones achieve that much, it seems right to
say that the Republic of Painting is now in conflict about the
status of Jones’ work: that work can no longer simply be
shrugged off. So now we have a version of the Republic of Art
“coming to a conclusion,” here, two conclusions, with as yet no
resolution. For we can also imagine articles, television
programs, and the like mounted to show that Jones is no artist
at all but, perhaps, just a jumped-up graphic designer. Still, at
this stage it seems more likely that a "new vote" in the
Republic of Painting might acknowledge Jones as a minor
artist. At the least, such a case is arguable in ways the Friends
of Jones know how to deploy.
As a third voice, consider the perspective from another
Republic: in particular, from the Republic of Film. Suppose
Smith, the director who ultimately chose or agreed to put
Jones’ painting in his movie, decides to write about the case,
extolling the virtues of at least that one work. Now this is
another kind of conflict. Smith has a voice all right, but not in
the Republic of Painting. (He is not, as Derek Jarman was, a
member of both Republics.) His ideas are taken up
vociferously by film fans but, in the nature of the beast, only a
few of those primarily interested in painting read the learned
journal to which Smith contributes. So there is another kind of
conflict here, still within the greater Republic of Art, but, as it
were, between constituent Republics with the Republic of Film
clashing with that of Painting. Again, perhaps this intervention
leads yet more people to look at paintings by Jones. And
guided by the writings of the Friends of Jones and of Smith,
the film director, some learn both to see and to value her
works. That is, they come to see her works as valuable, at
least as minimally valuable in ways required for art-
status.[31] For they come to see (a) how her work is both put
forward as art worthy of appreciation and not time-wasting for
that audience for art and (b) how it has been self-elected by
Jones and other-acclaimed by members of the Republic of
Painting (such as the Friends of Jones) and by members of
other Republics, such as the Republic of Film. Some of these,
of course, now want to say that Jones’ work, while art, is bad
art. But in that eventuality, they do so by drawing on the other
published articles; they give reasons why the normal
presumption of artistic value fails in this case. Yet others,
realizing that the Republic of Painting is in conflict, deny that
Jones’ work is art since, as they point out, it fails the crucial
test here by lacking the appropriate institutional action. As this
last group might put it, all the institutional action described so
far is still not sufficient.
Now we could begin to describe, say, the tone of the critical
articles written about Jones. Perhaps it was because the
negative ones were so hugely negative while the positive ones
were only lukewarm that the last group mentioned were able
to deny the art-status of Jones’ work. But further elaboration
is unnecessary. We have illustrated the plurality of voices,
together with one way (among many) in which they might be
resolved.
6. Conclusion
As this extended example shows, the resolution here is one for
rational debate. But the outcome is unclear, thus institutional
action should not be seen as an unproblematic notion. In
particular, whether or not the Republic of Art has other-
acclaimed a particular work may sometimes (although less
often than its critics assume) be difficult to resolve in practice,
as it was for Jones’ work by the end of the example. But this
does nothing to impugn the logical model of institutionalism
here. As with an account of the logical role of competent
judges,[32] the structure of the argument here reflects the
contours without requiring ‘all-or-nothing’ compliance.
First, the sorts of changes for which Jones waited (patiently?)
and the Friends of Jones initiated should be seen as a small
change in artistic sensibility, which is one reason they are
contentious. For what is suggested is, roughly, a re-writing of
the history of easel painting, as the original fogies had it, in
such a way as to find a place, however humble, for Jones. This
is best understood as modifying, however slightly, the
connections between key concepts. Now we can see X as a
precursor of Jones and, perhaps that will even allow us to say
something different about the work of X.[33] As that view of
the history of easel painting becomes more widespread, to the
extent it does, others will readily or immediately see Jones’
works a certain way in line with that history and as art,
although that will be one realization, not two!
Moreover, we could infer something about the state of the
artworld prior to the case of Jones if only we knew enough of
the detail, if we knew “the lay of the artworld.”[34] For to the
degree that the arguments for Jones succeeded in changing
taste, there was a ‘state of the artworld’ which permitted it.
Indeed, this is unsurprising. We could expect there to be
sociological congruences here. We might reflect on (a) the
factors which led Jones to paint as she did and (b) the factors
in the artworld that led her work ultimately to be
acknowledged, first by the Friends and then more generally.
And that will allow others to locate her work within traditions
of craftsmanship, of restoration, of presentation, and so on;
that is, within the institutional panoply of the Republic of Art.
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